For some, justice prevents people from defending their rights in the wrong way. This perspective has its justification, but offers an incomplete picture. Often, individuals may insist on their legal rights, even if it is immoral or undesirable for them to do so. The interesting question is therefore why justice sometimes cares about the behavior of embroiderers and is sometimes blind to it. This chapter will suggest that fairness allows courts not to assist individuals in enforcing their rights when it is morally doubtful that the courts will assist them. This perspective also influences the view that justice implies a distinctive, if not preferred, type of justice. This chapter suggests that equality justice may be better than ordinary legal justice, but it is not always better. Fatherhood is important when it comes to judging the merits of justice. A just plaintiff can willingly accept less than she is entitled to, bringing a kind of justice that is an improvement over the stubborn insistence on her rights.
If, on the other hand, an equitable judge forces the plaintiff to accept less than he or she is entitled to, the merits of that action may vary. This chapter discusses the important role of supporting equity. Among the main concerns of justice are institutions, understood as arrangements or frameworks of human action, which have a distinct normative identity and are oriented towards a goal or goal. The key example is trust. Many fundamental doctrines of trust have been developed to ensure the integrity of the institution of the trusts themselves, rather than to remedy justice within the framework of case law. Moreover, courts do not address the development of new forms of trust, but facilitate them by providing donors with more opportunities to express their intentions. In this way, justice serves a compelling view of liberalism, according to which a measure of the justification for state action lies in its contribution to a social, economic and political order in which people can lead independent lives. One mode of state action that promotes autonomy is the multiplication of institutional options from which people can choose. As laggards in the field of private law theory, examining the foundations of equity law raises fundamental questions about the relationship between law and morality, the nature of rights, and the extent to which we are willing to compromise on the ideal of the rule of law in order to achieve various social goals. In this volume, leading scholars in the field address these questions and questions of the underlying principles of justice and its relationship to the common law: What are the relationships, if any, between the legal, philosophical and moral meanings of „justice“? Is fairness a second-order restriction on the law? If so, is their operation contrary to the rule of law? Do different theories of justice require some kind of separation of law and justice – and if so, what kind of separation? The volume also highlights some of the most recent issues in case law that are embedded in the „merger“ debate.
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