Joseph Raz rejected Hart`s assertion that normative terms have distinctive meanings in statements of law. According to Raz, a normative statement such as „You must stop at a red light“ implies that you have some type of reason to act. If it is a statement that applies the law, it implies that you have reasons to stop from the point of view of the law. Raz`s legal theory, unlike Hart`s theory, is part of a theory of practical reason in general, and its presentation of normative statements treats them as the same meaning in law and morality. Hart initially thought that this approach would necessarily lead to an extreme type of natural law theory, in which any true legal statement is necessarily a true moral statement and any valid legal obligation is necessarily a moral obligation. But Raz resolved Hart`s concern by pointing out that normative statements can be made in a distanced manner. People can do them without supporting the point of view from where the reasons they state are valid (see Raz 1990, 175-177). Yet Hart did not accept Raz`s approach, which in his view established a conceptual link between law and morality. In response to Raz, he insisted that „statements about the subject`s legal obligations have nothing to do directly with the subject`s causes of action“ (Hart 1982, 267). And in an interview with the Spanish magazine Doxa towards the end of his career, he asserted „that legal and moral obligations are conceptually different,“ so a declaration of commitment has a different meaning in law and morality (De Paramo 1988). He never explained the difference in meaning; its necessity stems only from a methodological prejudice.
Legal English has particular relevance when applied to legal drafting and the preparation of written documents, including: If we accept the communication model, we conclude that participants in legal practice generally share an understanding of the meaning of the language of legislation; However, it remains clear that, in some cases, there will be deep disagreements about the impact of these legislative acts. A disagreement over the content of the law will arise when persons subject to the act will have to apply a test that, like the law in Garner v. Burr, can, in some cases, be controversial in its application. Similarly, disagreements will arise if the legislative act confers powers on a court (as the legislator often does) or if the legislator communicates in an unclear manner. Persons subject to the law must decide (and can argue) how the acts of the legislator are to be interpreted. And it can also be difficult (and controversial) in some cases if the legislature has the power it would have exercised, or if a court has the power to deviate from a decision of the legislature (and if so, if it should deviate from it). According to this view, the content of Community law depends on a traditional way of recognising legal norms. But if community members share a way of recognizing their right, how can they engage in the deep conflicts over the law that we all know so well? Dworkin has made this question a central point of the jurisprudential debate.
And he framed the question as an objection to a mistaken view of language and the relationship between law and language. He began his book Law`s Empire (Dworkin 1986b) by arguing that legal theorists like Hart cannot explain theoretical disagreements in legal practice because they believe lawyers share uncontested tests (tests that Dworkin called „criteria“) for the veracity of legislative proposals. The „semantic sting“ implies the misconception that the language of the law can only make sense if lawyers share such criteria. It is fatal to a legal theory because it leads the theorist to believe that people cannot have a deep (or „substantial“ or „real“) disagreement about the law. You can only discuss (1) empirical questions, such as the words used in a law, or (2) how to resolve falls of darkness, or (3) whether the law should be changed. If you suffer from the semantic sting, you will come to the conclusion that it would be like using the same words with different meanings to disagree on the criteria for applying the language of the law. People who disagree in this way only talk about each other. Here`s how Dworkin exposes the views of theorists who suffer from the semantic sting: how much easier would it be to say that normative language means the same thing in its moral uses and in its legal uses. While a person who says you need to stop at a red light may show different parameters, what they claim is a necessity that implies a (presumably) conclusive reason to stop. If the declaration is a legal declaration, necessity is a legal necessity; If the statement is a moral statement, necessity is a moral necessity.
In addition, Legal English is useful because of its dramatic effect: for example, a subpoena requiring a witness to appear in court often ends with the archaic threat of „not failing, at your own risk“; The „danger“ is not described (arrested and detained for contempt of court), but the formality of the language tends to affect the addressee of the summons more than a simple statement such as „We can arrest you if you do not show up“.
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